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Information asymmetry is a noteworthy matter in Chinese IPO market. 
Underwriter and Auditor ,as important mechanism to alleviate the information 
asymmetry between issuers and investors in order to help investors make reasonable 
decision .Recently the financial media blame the phenomenon that underwriters 
display obvious preference on certain auditors which will lead to the delivery of 
long-term interests and result in financial fraud in Chinese IPO market. There are two 
main possibilities related to the influence of underwriter-auditor relationship: On one 
hand, this relationship may result in conspiracy. As the so-called “people cooked 
hands make light work”, the past cooperation between underwriter and auditor will 
reduce the cost of conspiracy. In order to obtain abnormal economic benefits, the 
underwriters and auditors with close relationship urge to manipulate earnings upwards, 
decrease the quality of financial information and damage the interests of investors. On 
the other hand, the relationship may be a consequence of efficiently collaborations 
and deep trust relationships, by which the information asymmetry and transaction cost 
are lowered and thus IPO earnings management is reduced. 
   Underwriter-auditor social connection is a unique phenomenon in Chinese IPO 
market ,which provide a good background for us to study whether underwriter-auditor 
social connection influence auditor choice of IPO company. Based on the relationship 
of underwrite and auditor ,we study whether underwriter-auditor social connection 
influence auditor choice of IPO company and the economic consequence of that 
auditor choice . 
    To empirically test my conjecture, I construct a sample of 1,020 firms that 
intend to go public covering the period form 2006 to 2012. The empirical results show 
the closer relationship between underwriter and auditor, the IPO company is willing 
to choice the associated auditor. And choosing associated auditor will result in some 
negative economic consequences. From the perspective of issuers, choosing 
















performance, choosing  the associated auditor will damage significantly market 
performance . From the perspective of auditors, choosing  the associated auditor will 
increase IPO auditor fee and improve the IPO market share of auditor. From the 
perspective of underwriter, the underwriter can obtain higher fees. My study support 
the progressive logic: the company make use of the relationship choosing the 
associated auditors and increase discretionary accruals in order to achieve IPO 
purpose. During the process ,the underwriter and auditors can earn abnormal 
economic benefits and significantly increase the market share. But finally the 
conspiracy behaviors will be exposed and punished by the capital market. We further 
test the influence of reputation mechanism of underwriter and auditor in auditor 
choice. The empirical results show that the auditor choice is in favor of 
relationship ,not in quality, which demonstrated the Chinese IPO market lack of 
demand for high quality auditors. 
My research contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: First, my 
study adds to the literature on the auditor choice in IPO market by investigating the 
influence of underwriter-auditor relationship on the auditor choice and analyze the 
economic consequences .Second ,my results show that the relationship between 
underwriter and auditors will damage the independence of intermediary organization, 
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余管理行为、降低 IPO 后两年业绩变脸概率，并减少 IPO后三个月股价波动性。
而赖少娟（2015）[2]将券商和审计师合作关系密切程度称之为券商—审计师绑定
关系，发现券商和审计机构是在收益风险权衡下选择合作抑或合谋，券商和审计
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